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NOTES
SEARCH AND SEIZURE-A CONSTITUTIONAL
STANDARD FOR SOUTH CAROLINA
The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Mapp V.
Ohio' is generally recognized as a landmark decision in the field
of search and seizure. The holding in Mapp that evidence
obtained in an illegal search and seizure is inadmissible in state
court criminal prosecutions overruled Volf v. Oolorado,2 which
had been the authority for the doctrine that the exclusionary
rule3 was applicable only to federal courts. Mapp enforced the
protections of the fourth amendment against the states through
the fourteenth amendment.
As is often the case with a decision that overturns an estab-
lished rule, the extent of Mapp was not completely clear. There-
fore, in the next term, the Court used Ker v. California4 to eluci-
date the Mapp decision. In Ker the Court held that although
Aapp stood for the proposition that evidence obtained in an
unreasonable search and seizure was inadmissible in state courts,
the states could establish standards of reasonableness, subject
only to review by the Supreme Court.
These two cases have marked the turning point in the law of
search and seizure. They have generated as much comment by
law review writers as any other subject in recent years.6 There
1. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
2. 338 U.S. 25 (1949). The Court held that the fourth amendment is enforce-
able against the states through the fourteenth amendment, but that the latter
did not, in a prosecution in a state court for a state crime, forbid the admission
of evidence obtained in an illegal search and seizure.
3. The exclusionary rule was laid down in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S.
383 (1914). There the Court held that the fourth amendment barred the use
in federal prosecutions of evidence secured through an illegal search and
seizure. This rule was later extended to prohibit federal agents from turning
over illegally obtained evidence to state authorities for use in a state prosecu-
tion. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
4. 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
5. See, e.g., Broder, The Decline and Fall of Wolf v. Colorado, 41 NE. L.
REv. 185 (1961); Collins, Toward Workable Rules of Search and Seizure-
An Ainicus Curiae Brief, 50 CALIF. L. Rnv. 421 (1962); Knowlton, Supreme
Court, Mapp v. Ohio and Due Process of Law, 49 IowA L. REv. 14 (1963);
Morris, The End of an, Experiment in Federalism-A Note on Mapp v. Ohio,
36 WAsH. L. REv. 407 (1961); Sloan & Leeds, Mapp for the Road Towards
Exclusion, 35 TEmP. L.Q. 27 (1961); Specter, Mapp v. Ohio (81 Sup. Ct.
1684): Pandora's Problems for the Prosecutor, 111 U. PA. L. REv. 4 (1962);
Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio (81 Sup. Ct. 1684) at Large in the Fifty States, 1962
DUIE L.J. 319.
The cases also produced a profusion of student comment. On Mapp, see,
e.g., 24 GA. B.J. 129 (1961); 50 GA. L.J. 166 (1961); 47 IowA L. Rav. 254
687
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will be no attempt here to discuss Aapp and Ker in depth-their
holdings will be taken at face value. The purpose of this article
is to determine the effect of the federal rules on the law of South
Carolina, with the objective of establishing definitive rules of
search and seizure that will stand under attack.6
There is now justifiable speculation that the federal rules of
search and seizure apply to the states in toto. In stating a clear
constitutional standard it is necessary, therefore, to establish
a federal standard.
I. Tmn FRDrnIr STANDARD
Prior to 1961 the rules of search and seizure were applied by
a "double standard'--the federal courts and a minority of states
holding that evidence obtained in an illegal search and seizure
was not admissible in a criminal prosecution, and the majority
of the states holding that such evidence was admissible. All
courts were put on equal footing by the Supreme Court in Mapp.
It becomes necessary therefore to determine when the search is
unreasonable and thus illegal.
A. Persons and Objects Protected
The fourth amendment prohibits the unreasonable search and
seizure of one's person,7 home,8 private papers, 9 and effects.'0
(1962); 38 N.D.L. Rav. 117 (1962); 23 OIO ST. L.J. 147 (1962); 9 U.C.L.A.
L. REv. 254 (1962); 23 U. PITT. L. REv. 233 (1961). On Ker see, e.g., 30
Bnoo.LYN L. REv. 145 (1963); 24 LA. L. REv. 401 (1964); 39 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 227 (1964); 38 TUL. L. REv. 414 (1964); 11 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 426
(1964); 1963 U. InI.. L.F. 501.
6. Similar studies have been conducted in several states. See, e.g., Barnette,
Impact of Mapp v. Ohio (81 Sup. Ct. 1684) Upon the Connecticut Law of
Search and Seizure, 37 CONN. B.J. 52 (1963) ; Scurlock, Searches and Seizures
in Missouri, 29 U. KAN. CITY L. REv. 242 (1961); Thompson, Illinois Search
and Seizure Law-The New Frontier, 11 DE PAUL L. REv. 27 (1961); Wil-
liams, Trends of Search and Seizure in Florida, 16 U. FLA. L. REv. 180 (1963) ;
Woody, Illegal Searches and Seizures-The Conflict Between Federal and
Texas Courts, 6 So. TEx. L. J. 91 (1962) ; Note, Search and Seizure In New
Jersey, 18 RUTGERs L. REv. 177 (1963) ; Note, Search and Seizure in Califor-
ina, 4 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 86 (1963).
7. Wrightson v. United States, 222 F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Nelson v.
Hancock, 239 F. Supp. 857 (D.N.H. 1965).
8. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961) ; United States v. Jeffers,
342 U.S. 48 (1951); Weaver v. United States, 295 F.2d 360 (5th Cir. 1961);
Catalanotte v. United States, 208 F.2d 264 (6th Cir. 1953) ; Drayton v. United
States, 205 F.2d 35 (5th Cir. 1953) ; Worthington v. United States, 166 F.2d
557 (6th Cir. 1948); In re Milburne, 77 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1935); United
States v. Kaplan, 17 F. Supp. 920 (E.D.N.Y. 1936).
9. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886); United States v. Thompson,
113 F,2d 643 (7th Cir. 1940).
10. Marullo v. United States, 328 F.2d 361 (5th Cir. 1964) ; United States v.
Peisner, 311 F.2d 94 (4th Cir. 1962) ; Weaver v. United States, 295 F.2d 360
(5th Cir. 1961); United States v. Scott, 149 F. Supp. 837 (D.D.C. 1957).
[Vol. 17
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1. One's Person. Search of one's person is illegal unless it is
pursuant to an arrest. Forceful physical examinations are un-
reasonable, although done under the authority of a search war-
rant or in one of the several situations where a warrant is not
required." On the other hand, if consent is given or if the search
is otherwise non-forceful, the Constitution is not violated.1
2 The
federal rule today apparently prohibits a violent interference
with one's bodily integrity in order to secure evidence. 13 There
is a strong possibility, however, that this rule might not meet
the constitutional test and the sounder view is that any violation
of the accused's body sanctity without affirmative consent is
illegal.
14
2. One's Home. The right of officers to thrust themselves into
a home is a matter of grave concern, and only in the most excep-
tional circumstances can the warrant be dispensed with.15
11. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). In this case two officers
illegally entered the defendant's dwelling, at which time he swallowed two
morphine capsules. The officers took him to the hospital and pumped his
stomach, from which the capsules were recovered and introduced as evidence
at the trial. In reversing the conviction, Justice Frankfurter stated that con-
victions cannot be brought about by methods which offend "a sense of justice."
Id. at 173. See also United States v. Townsend, 151 F. Supp. 378 (D.C. Cir.
1957) (dictum) ; United States v. Willis, 85 F. Supp. 745 (S.D. Cal. 1949).
12. Briethaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957). The defendant was the driver
of an automobile involved in an accident. Since he was suspected of driving
while intoxicated a blood test was taken from him while he was still uncons-
cious. In a subsequent trial for manslaughter the results of the test were intro-
duced in evidence. Affirming the conviction, the Supreme Court held that the
absence of conscious consent does not necessarily render the taking a violation
of defendant's constitutional rights, and that the test administered here could
not have been considered oppressive by even the most delicate. The Court
further said:
It might be a fair assumption that a driver on the highways, in obedience
to a policy of the State, would consent to have a blood test made as a part
of a sensible and civilized system of protecting himself as well as other
citizens not only from the hazards of the road due to drunken driving, but
also from some use of dubious lay testimony.
Id. at 436 n.2.
13. Annot., 25 A.L.R.2d 1407, 1412 (1952).
14. Briethaupt v. Abram, 353 U.S. 432 (1957) (dissenting opinions). Mr.
Chief Justice Warren and Mr. Justices Black and Douglas dissented on the
ground that this case was indistinguishable from Rochin v. California, note 11
supra. The latter two Justices, in a separate dissenting opinion, expressed the
view that due process is not limited to a prohibition of force against the accused,
but equally prohibits the violation of the body sanctity of an unconscious man.
These dissents by three of the Court's most influential Justices, along with the
fact that this was a pre-Mapp decision, considerably weakens this case. It is
doubtful if today anything short of actual consent, in the case of a violation of
one's person, would be considered reasonable. For an earlier case to this effect
see Application of Fried, 68 F. Supp. 961 (S.D.N.Y. 1946), where the court held
that non-resistence is not equal to consent to search after arrest. See also
United States v. Hoffenburg, 24 F. Supp. 989 (E.D.N.Y. 1938).
15. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948). See also Agnello v. United
States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925).
NoT s1965]
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Neither inconvenience to the officer nor probable cause for
belief that certain articles are in the dwelling justify a search
without a warrant.' 6 Apparently the only time that a search
of a home can be conducted without a warrant is when such
a search is incident to a lawful arrest 17 or when the defendant
consents to the search.:' This protection includes situations
where the residents are not at home and the officers can enter
peacefully, or where the home is vacant at the time of the
search.' 9
"Home" is not limited to dwelling houses but includes a place
of residence,20 or the place a man considers his home, although
he is absent a great deal of time.2 ' Thus an apartment,2 2 a room
in a boarding house,23 and a hotel room24 are within the protec-
tion of the Constitution.
Neither have the courts limited their interpretation to the
residence itself. Buildings within the curtilage of the dwelling
house are also included. 25 On the other hand, buildings clearly
16. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948) (inconvenience of obtaining
a warrant) ; Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493 (1958) (existence of prob-
able cause). See also McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948) ; Wil-
liams v. United States, 276 F.2d 522 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Catalanotte v. United
States, 208 F.2d 264 (6th Cir. 1953); Papani v. United States, 84 F.2d 160
(9th Cir. 1936) ; Brown v. United States, 83 F.2d 383 (3d Cir. 1936).
17. For a general discussion of searches incident to arrests see notes 86 to 102
infra, and accompanying text. For cases to this effect see, e.g., Harris v. United
States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947); Robertson v. United States, 165 F.2d 752 (6th
Cir. 1948) ; Shew v. United States, 155 F.2d 628 (4th Cir. 1946) ; United States
v. Sam Chin, 24 F. Supp. 14 (D. Md. 1938).
18. See generally notes 110 to 20 infra, and accompanying text. See also
United States v. Saka, 339 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1964); United States v. Minor,
117 F. Supp. 697 (E.D. Okla. 1953).
19. Morrison v. United States, 262 F.2d 449 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Steeber v.
United States, 198 F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1952) ; Roberson v. United States, 165
F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1948); United States v. Thomas, 216 F. Supp. 942 (N.D.
Cal. 1963). But see United States v. Romano, 330 F.2d 566 (2d Cir. 1964).
20. United States v. Minor, 117 F. Supp. 697 (E.D. Okla. 1953).
21. United States v. Novero, 58 F. Supp. 275 (E.D. Mo. 1944).
22. Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139 (1962); United States v. Miguel, 340
F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1965); United States v. Scott, 149 F. Supp. 837 (D.D.C.
1957).
23. United States ex rel Clark v. Maroney, 339 F.2d 710 (3d Cir. 1965);
United States v. Marrese, 336 F.2d 501 (3d Cir. 1964).
24. United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951); Hall v. Warden Md. Peni-
tentiary, 313 F.2d 483 (4th Cir. 1963). Probable cause will not justify search
of a hotel room without a warrant. Eng Fung Jem v. United States, 281 F.2d
803 (9th Cir. 1960). As in the case of a dwelling house, the search is justified
if incident to a lawful arrest. United States v. Lodewijkz, 230 F. Supp. 212
(S.D.N.Y. 1964). After the hotel room has been vacated and the manager
gives his consent there can be no objection to the search. Abel v. United States,
362 U.S. 217 (1960).
25. Care v. United States, 231 F.2d 22 (10th Cir. 1956) ; Janney v. United
States, 206 F.2d 601 (4th Cir. 1953).
[Vol. IT
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located outside the curtilage are not protected.26 Whether a
building is within the curtilage is to be determined from the
facts, including proximity or annexation to the dwelling, its
inclusion within the general enclosure surrounding the dwelling,
and its use and enjoyment as an adjunct to the domestic economy
of the family.27 Garages have been held to be within the cur-
tilage,28 and although there is authority to the contrary,29 this
is the sounder rule and probably represents the federal standard
today. Similarly, barns,30 bathhouses,31 sheds,32 and smoke-
houses 3 have been included within the curtilage. An open field,
on the other hand, is not entitled to the amendments protection."4
Still a further extension of the amendment's protection is to
places of business 35 provided they are not open to the public.38
A person's office or the desk assigned to him for his exclusive
use is protected,3 7 but if the desk or office is for the common
use of several employees a warrant is not required.33
26. Brock v. United States, 256 F.2d 55 (5th Cir. 1958); Hodges v. United
States, 243 F.2d 281 (5th Cir. 1957) ; United States v. Thomas, 216 F. Supp.
942 (N.D. Cal. 1963); United States v. Wilds, 87 F. Supp. 459 (E.D. Tenn.
1949).
27. United States v. Minker, 312 F.2d 632 (3d Cir. 1962); Care v. United
States, 231 F.2d 22 (10th Cir. 1956); United States v. Lewis, 227 F. Supp. 433
(S.D.N.Y. 1964).
28. Costner v. United States, 252 F.2d 496 (6th Cir. 1958) ; Martin v. United
States, 183 F.2d 436 (4th Cir. 1950); United States v. Hayden, 140 F. Supp.
429 (D. Md. 1956); United States v. Novero, 58 F. Supp. 275 (E.D. Mo.
1944); United States v. Fowler, 17 F.R.D. 499 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
29. Carney v. United States, 163 F.2d 784 (9th Cir. 1947); Kitt v. United
States, 132 F.2d 920 (4th Cir. 1942); Earl v. United States, 4 F.2d 532 (9th
Cir. 1925).
30. Walker v. United States, 225 F.2d 447 (5th Cir. 1955); United States v.
DiCorvo, 37 F.2d 124 (D. Conn. 1924). Probable cause is sufficient, however,
for searching a barn without a warrant. United States v. Preisner, 96 F.2d
138 (2d Cir. 1938).
31. Wakkuri v. United States, 67 F.2d 844 (6th Cir. 1933).
32. United States v. Carter, 118 F. Supp. 559 (W.D. Pa. 1954).
33. United States v. Mullin, 329 F.2d 295 (4th Cir. 1964); Roberson v.
United States, 165 F.2d 762 (6th Cir. 1948).
34. See, e.g., Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924) ; United States v.
Hassell, 336 F.2d 684 (6th Cir. 1964) ; Hodges v. United States, 243 F.2d 281
(5th Cir. 1957); United States v. Romano, 203 F. Supp. 27 (D.Conn. 1962);
United States v. Sims, 202 F. Supp. 65 (E.D. Tenn. 1962); United States v.
Hayden, 140 F. Supp. 429 (D. Md. 1956); Taylor v. Fine, 115 F. Supp. 68
(S.D. Cal. 1953).
35. Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921); Silverthorne Lumber Co.
v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920) ; Martin v. United States, 183 F.2d 436
(4th Cir. 1950); In re Phoenix Cereal Beverage Co., 58 F.2d 953 (2d Cir.
1932) ; United States v. Vlahos, 19 F. Supp. 166 (D. Ore. 1937).
36. Fisher v. United States, 205 F.2d 702 (D.C. Cir. 1953); McWalters v.
United States, 6 F.2d 224 (9th Cir. 1925).
37. United States v. Block, 188 F.2d 1019 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
38. Freeman v. United States, 201 A2d 22 (D.C. App. 1964).
1965] NoTs
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3. Private Papers. If the purpose of the government is to use
private papers solely as evidence, such a seizure is illegal regard-
less of the lawfulness of the search which discovered them.
39 On
the other hand, if these documents were used as a means to
commit the crime, seizure is lawful.40 The government cannot,
however, seize the entire contents of any house it might have
searched.41 Mfere evidence cannot be seized, but instruments of
the crime are always proper subjects of a search.
In contrast to this rule, public records are not protected. 42
Public records include documents in public registration offices,43
and records required by law to be kept in order that there may
be suitable information of transactions which are appropriate
subjects of government regulation.44 Similarly, corporate rec-
ords are not within the protection of the amendment.45 There
can be, therefore, no objection to the seizure of public or quasi-
public records although the search is without a warrant.
4. Effect. Articles that have been considered effects and
therefore not subject to search and seizure without a warrant
are books,45 automobiles, 47 clothing,48 and mail.49 If in the
39. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960) ; Gouled v. United States, 255
U.S. 298 (1921).
40. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960); United States v. Clancy,
276 F.2d 617 (7th Cir. 1960) ; United States v. Best, 76 F. Supp. 857 (D. Mass.
1948).
41. Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476 (1965).
42. Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582 (1946).
43. Davis v. United States, 138 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1943).
44. Peeples v. United States, 341 F.2d 60 (5th Cir. 1965) ; Bowles v. Insel,
148 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1945); United States v. Pine Valley Poultry Distribs.
Corp., 187 F. Supp. 455 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Wagman v. Arnold, 152 F. Supp.
637 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); United States v. Kempe, 59 F. Supp. 905 (N.D. Iowa
1945); Bowles v. Stitzinger, 59 F. Supp. 94 (W.D. Pa. 1945).
45. Essgee Co. v. United States, 262 U.S. 151 (1923); Wilson v. United
States, 340 F.2d 950 (8th Cir. 1965); Lagow v. United States, 159 F. 2d
245 (2d Cir. 1946) ; Genecov v. Federal Petroleum Bd., 146 F.2d 596 (5th Cir.
1945) ; United States v. White, 137 F.2d 24 (3d Cir. 1943) ; In re Greenspan,
187 F. Supp. 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) ; United States v. Cardiff, 95 F. Supp. 206
(E.D. Wash. 1951). Contra, Fleming v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 114 F.2d
384 (7th Cir. 1940); United States v. Kanan, 225 F. Supp. 711 (D. Ariz.
1963).
46. United States v. Peisner, 311 F.2d 94 (4th Cir. 1962). The court said
that the fourth amendment was broad enough to afford protection against un-
reasonable searches and seizures to all types of property although contraband
or obscene in nature. See also Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476 (1965) where
the Court held that the seizure of 2,000 books, papers, and pamphlets belonging
to a suspected Communist propagandist was illegal.
47. Weller v. Russell, 321 F.2d 848 (3d Cir. 1963) ; United States v. Peisner,
311 F.2d 94 (4th Cir. 1962). See also notes 57 to 62 infra and accompanying
text.
48. Nelson v. Hancock, 239 F. Supp. 857 (D.N.H. 1965).
49. Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. (6 Otto) 727 (1877) ; Oliver v. United States,
243 F.2d 391 (10th Cir. 1957); United States v. Fulcher, 229 F. Supp. 456
[Vol. 17
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course of an otherwise lawful search, however, officers discover
evidence of some other crime, it may be seized and used in a
subsequent trial.50
Effects lose their protection if they are abandoned. 51 Thus
property left in a vacated hotel room, 5 2 a trash can,53 an open
field,54 or a public place55 is subject to seizure without objection.
Abandonment is precluded, however, when the premises are
under the control of the individual.56
5. Automobiles. A much litigated and uncertain field arises
as to automobiles. The general rule is that motor vehicles are
within the protection of the amendment.57 If the search of an
automobile is not incident to a lawful arrest or is without the
consent of the owner, its validity is determined by reasonableness
and probable cause; but the requirements are more lenient, and
the standard less rigid, than that applied to dwelling houses.55
Probable cause must exist to search a motor vehicle without
a warrant,5 9 but at least two cases say that probable cause alone
(D. Md. 1964). However, the mail must be first class and sealed. If it is of a
class subject to postal inspection, search and seizure without a warrant does not
violate the amendment. See, e.g., Santana v. United States, 329 F.2d 854 (lst
Cir. 1964) ; Webster v. United States, 92 F2d 462 (6th Cir. 1937). There are
a few exceptional situations where letters are not protected, such as letters
sent to or from prison. See, e.g., Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 15 (1919) ;
Adams v. Ellis, 197 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1952) ; In re Bull, 123 F. Supp. 389 (D.
Nev. 1954).
50. Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921); Kelly v. United States,
197 F.2d 162 (5th Cir. 1952); United States v. Kaplan, 17 F. Supp. 920
(E.D.N.Y. 1936).
51. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960); Hester v. United States,
265 U.S. 57 (1924); Frank v. United States, 347 F.2d 486 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
52. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960); Frank v. United States, 347
F.2d 486 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
53. United States v. Calise, 217 F. Supp. 705 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) ; United States
v. Minker, 191 F. Supp. 683 (E.D. Pa. 1961).
54. Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
55. Trujillo v. United States, 294 F.2d 583 (10th Cir. 1961).
56. Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253, n.6 (1960). A package dropped to
the floor by a passenger who was occupying a taxicab is not abandoned.
57. Smith v. United States, 335 F2d 270 (D.C. Cir. 1964) ; Weller v. Russel,
321 F.2d 848 (3d Cir. 1963); United States v. Peisner, 311 F.2d 94 (4th Cir.
1962) ; Moring v. United States, 40 F.2d 267 (5th Cir. 1930). Cf. United
States v. Gilliam, 87 F. Supp. 808 (E.D. Tenn. 1950).
58. [Q]uestions involving searches of motor cars or other things readily
moved cannot be treated as identical to questions arising out of searches
of fixed structures like houses, . . . what may be an unreasonable search
of a house may be reasonable in the case of a motor car.
Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 366-67 (1964). See also United States
v. Sutton, 321 F.2d 221 (4th Cir. 1963); Patenotte v. United States, 266 F.2d
647 (5th Cir. 1959).
59. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949) ; Owens v. United States,
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is not sufficient.60 The courts more often speak in terms of
reasonableness, and the existence of probable cause is often con-
sidered in determining if the search was reasonable. The most
important factor in determining reasonableness is actual and
immediate necessity. If there is a danger that the vehicle may
be removed out of the locality or jurisdiction, the warrant may
be dispensed with.61 If the possibility of removal is not present,
such as when the owner is in police custody, the vehicle can be
searched only pursuant to a warrant.
6 2
B. Nature and Extent of the Search
1. Concept of Reasonableness. All unreasonable searches and
seizures are prohibited by the fourth amendment.63 Reasonable-
ness is a question of fact that must be determined from the par-
ticular circumstances of each case.64 There is no fixed formula for
its determination ;65 neither can a test be stated in rigid or abso-
lute terms.6 6 Like all questions of fact the determination is for
60. Smith v. United States, 335 F2d 270 (D.C. Cir. 1964) ; Hart v. United
States, 162 F.2d 74 (10th Cir. 1947).
61. United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965); United States v.
Sutton, 321 F.2d 221 (4th Cir. 1963) ; United States v. Bonanno, 180 F. Supp.
71 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
62. Westover v. United States, 342 F.2d 684 (9th Cir. 1965); Smith v.
Unitcd States, 335 F.2d 270 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Conti v. Morgenthan, 232 F.
Supp. 1004 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). But ree Burge v. United States, 342 F.2d 408 (9th
Cir. 1965).
63. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1945); Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132 (1925); Caldwell v. United States, 338 F.2d 385 (8th Cir. 1964);
Burge v. United States, 333 F2d 385 (9th Cir. 1964); United States v.
Zimmerman, 326 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1963); Lane v. United States, 321 F.2d
573 (5th Cir. 1963); McDonald v. United States, 307 F.2d 272 (10th Cir.
1962); White v. United States, 271 F.2d 829 (D.C. Cir. 1959) ; United States
v. Pardo-Bolland, 229 F. Supp. 473 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) ; United States v. Roberts,
223 F. Supp. 745 (E.D. Ark. 1963); United States v. Sorenson, 202 F. Supp.
524 (E.D.N.Y. 1962); United States v. Juvelis, 194 F. Supp. 745 (D.N.J. 1961).
64. See, e.g., Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963) ; Arwine v. Bannan, 346
F.2d 458 (6th Cir. 1965) ; United States v. Jones, 340 F.2d 913 (7th Cir. 1964) ;
Davis v. United States, 327 F.2d 301 (9th Cir. 1964); Lano v. United States,
321 F.2d 573 (10th Cir. 1963); Keinick v. United States, 242 F.2d 818 (8th
Cir. 1957) ; Drayton v. United States, 205 F.2d 35 (5th Cir. 1953) ; Martin v.
United States, 183 F.2d 436 (4th Cir. 1950); Maxwell v. Stephens, 229 F.
Supp. 205 (E.D. Ark. 1964); United States v. Lewis, 227 F. Supp. 433
(S.D.N.Y. 1964).
65. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950); Arwine v. Bonnan,
346 F.2d 458 (6th Cir. 1965).
66. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947); Flores v. United States,
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the trial court,67 and although not binding on the reviewing
court, it is entitled to weight.08
It is therefore virtually impossible to state a comprehensive
standard that would be of any practical importance. Neverthe-
less, one court has said that the test in determining if a search
and seizure was unreasonable is whether the thing done in sum
of its form, scope, nature, incidents, and effects impresses the
mind as being fundamentally unfair or unreasonable in a spe-
cific situation when the immediate end sought is considered
against the private right affected.69 The question is one of a
realistic, not a theoretical, approach.70  Reasonableness is a
question of degree-a balance between the right of privacy and
the right of search.7'1 These tests are all subjective and must be
used only as principles, not as rules.
7 2
More concrete guidelines than the subjective test might prove
beneficial. The validity of a search without a warrant in one
of the situations where a warrant is not required, for example,
turns upon reasonableness under all the circumstances and not
upon the practicability of procuring a warrant.7 3 Among the
tangible factors to be considered are the time of day or night the
search was conducted, the type of property, enclosed or unen-
closed, where entry was effected, the distance from the business
or dwelling where the search took place, the object or place that
was subjected to the search, the presence of force or coercion, the
definiteness and type of information that caused the officers to
enter, and the time elements involved in entry, search, and
seizure.7
4
The effect of the cases is to point out that no comprehensive
standard can be stated for the determination of an unreasonable
search; the facts and circumstances of each case are controlling,
and precedents are helpful only as guidelines. In the light of
recent Supreme Court decisions, however, it is likely that the
67. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961) ; United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950); Dicks v. United
States, 247 F2d 745 (10th Cir. 1957).
68. Blackford v. United States, 247 F.2d 745 (9th Cir. 1957).
69. United States v. Haskins, 213 F. Supp. 551 (E.D. Tenn. 1962).
70. Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855 (8th Cir. 1956).
71. Giacona v. United States, 257 F.2d 450 (5th Cir. 1958).
72. Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855 (8th Cir. 1956).
73. Janney v. United States, 206 F.2d 601 (4th Cir. 1953) ; United States v.
Hayden, 140 F. Supp. 429 (D. Md. 1956).
74. United States v. Hayden, supra note 73. See also Jones v. United States,
339 F.2d 419 (5th Cir. 1964).
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courts will require the search to meet stricter standards of
reasonableness.
2. Ewtent of Protection. The privilege of the amendment is
personal and can only be claimed by the person whose rights
have been invaded.75 The individual who has no proprietary
interest in the property searched has no standing to assert vio-
lation of his constitutional rights.76 Further, the protection
reaches all alike, whether guilty or innocent,7 but any previous
criminal record can be considered in determining the reasonable-
ness of the search.
7 8
A search must be legal at its commencement; an illegal search
is not made valid by what it turns up.79 General exploratory
searches are prohibited whether they are conducted under a
search warrant or in one of the situations where the search is
valid without a warrant.80 Thus a search whose sole purpose is
75. Murray v. United States, 333 F.2d 409 (10th Cir. 1964) ; Baskerville v.
United States, 227 F.2d 454 (10th Cir. 1955); United States v. Eversole, 209
F.2d 766 (7th Cir. 1954) ; Kitt v. United States, 132 F.2d 920 (4th Cir. 1942) ;
United States ex rel Pantari v. Maroney, 220 F. Supp. 801 (W.D. Pa. 1963) ;
Dorfman v. Rombs, 218 F. Supp. 905 (N.D. Ill. 1963); United States v. One
1955 Cadillac Eldorado Convertible, 148 F. Supp. 752 (E.D. Ill. 1957); United
States v. Alberti, 120 F. Supp. 171 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); United States v. One
1951 Cadillac Sedan, 107 F. Supp. 491 (W.D. Okla. 1952); United States v.
One 1948 Cadillac Convertible Coupe, 115 F. Supp. 723 (D.NJ. 1953).
76. United States v. Thomas, 342 F.2d 132 (6th Cir. 1965); Baskerville v.
United States, 227 F.2d 454 (10th Cir. 1955) ; Casey v. United States, 191
F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1951) ; United States ex rel Smith v. Reincke, 239 F. Supp.
887 (D. Conn. 1965); United States v. Shelton, 59 F. Supp. 273 (E.D. Ky.
1945).
77. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948); Trupiano v. United
States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282
U.S. 344 (1931); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 392 (1913); Lawson v.
United States, 254 F.2d 706 (8th Cir. 1958) ; Brock v. United States, 223 F.2d
681 (5th Cir. 1955); Catalanotte v. United States, 208 F.2d 264 (6th Cir.
1953) ; United States ex rel Staples v. United States, 222 F. Supp. 998 (N.D.
Ill. 1963) ; United States v. Marci, 185 F. Supp. 144 (D. Conn. 1960) ; United
States v. Duane, 66 F. Supp. 459 (D. Neb. 1946).
78. Martin v. United States, 183 F.2d 436 (4th Cir. 1950).
79. Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927) ; United States v. Como, 340
F.2d 891 (2d Cir. 1965); Cochran v. United States, 291 F.2d 633 (8th Cir.
1961) ; Cervantes v. United States, 278 F.2d 350 (9th Cir. 1960) ; United States
v. Arrington, 215 F.2d 630 (7th Cir. 1954); United States v. Bush, 136 F.
Supp. 490 (E.D. Tenn. 1956) ; United States v. Turner, 126 F. Supp. 349 (D.
Md. 1954); United States v. Sully, 56 F. Supp. 942 (S.D.N.Y. 1944).
80. Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476 (1965); United States v. Rabinowitz,
339 U.S. 56 (1950) ; United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932) ; United
States v. Haley, 321 F.2d 956 (6th Cir. 1963) ; Drayton v. United States, 205
F.2d 35 (5th Cir. 1953) ; Poldo v. United States, 55 F.2d 866 (9th Cir. 1932) ;
United States v. 1013 Crates of Empty Old Smuggler Whiskey Bottles, 52 F.2d
49 (2d Cir. 1931); United States v. Stern, F. Supp. 187 (S.D.N.Y. 1964);
United States v. Kidd, 153 F. Supp. 605 (W.D. La. 1957).
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the securing of evidence is invalid.8 1 On the other hand, it is not
a search to observe what is open and patent in either daylight
or artificial light, and police officers lawfully on the premises
may seize fruits of the crime that are lying about in the open.
82
Observation is not an illegal search.
8
C. Justification of Searches
A search is justified if conducted pursuant to a legally ob-
tained and properly executed warrant. The requirements for
obtaining and executing such a warrant are discussed in sec-
tion D.
A reasonable search, although without a warrant, does not
violate the fourth amendment. A search without a warrant is
reasonable (1) if it is incidental to a lawful arrest, (2) if there
is an immediate necessity to search, or (3) if the individual
consents or waives his constitutional protection.
The existence of probable cause alone is not sufficient to jus-
tify a search without a warrant.84 The belief that an article is
in a dwelling furnishes no justification for a search without a
warrant, and such a search is unlawful notwithstanding facts
unquestionably showing probable cause.8 5 Probable cause is
merely a factor in determining if a search without a warrant
was reasonable.
1. Incident to Arrest. A search may be conducted without a
warrant if it is incident to an arrest.86 The Supreme Court has
81. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960) ; United States v. Sigal, 341
F.2d 837 (3d Cir. 1965) ; Marderosian v. United States, 337 F.2d 759 (lst Cir.
1964) ; United States v. Guido, 251 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1958) ; Harris v. United
States, 151 F.2d 837 (10th Cir. 1945).
82. See, e.g., Fagundes v. United States, 340 F.2d 673 (1st Cir. 1965);
United States v. Barone, 330 F.2d 543 (2d Cir. 1964) ; Davis v. United States,
327 F.2d 301 (9th Cir. 1964); United States v. Williams, 314 F.2d 795 (6th
Cir. 1963); Petteway v. United States, 261 F.2d 53 (4th Cir. 1958); United
States v. McDaniel, 154 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1957); United States v. Strick-
land, 62 F. Supp. 468 (W.D.S.C. 1945).
83. United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559 (1927) ; Safarick v. United States,
62 F.2d 892 (8th Cir. 1933); Smith v. United States, 2 F.2d 715 (4th Cir.
1924) ; Boyd v. United States, 286 Fed. 930 (4th Cir. 1923).
84. Sirimarco v. United States, 315 F.2d 299 (9th Cir. 1963) ; United States
v. One 1957 Ford Ranchero Pickup Truck, 265 F.2d 21 (10th Cir. 1959).
85. Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961).
86. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960); Jones v. United States,
357 U.S. 493 (1958); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947); United
States v. Burkhart, 347 F.2d 772 (6th Cir. 1965); United States v. Grisby,
335 F.2d 652 (4th Cir. 1964) ; United States v. Hanley, 321 F.2d 956 (6th Cir.
1963) ; Pold v. United States, 291 F.2d 230 (9th Cir. 1961) ; Barks v. United
States, 287 F.2d 117 (9th Cir. 1961) ; United States v. Hopkins, 263 F.2d 597
(7th Cir. 1959); Williams v. United States, 260 F.2d 125 (8th Cir. 1958);
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deviated from this rule only once,8 7 and this case was subse-
quently overruled.18
In order for the search to be valid the arrest must be valid. 9
The arrest is lawful if the officer had probable cause for belief
that a crime had been or was being committed.90 If the evi-
dence obtained by a search which was not in truth incidental to
an arrest, but instead the arrest was the result of the search, it
must be excluded. 91 The arrest must be for the purpose of arrest,
and not for the purpose of searching.
This rule does not validate all searches incident to an arrest,
however, and definite limitations have been imposed. One such
limitation is the time when it may be conducted. It is sufficient
if the search was substantially contemporaneous with the
arrest, 2 but where the line would be drawn is uncertain. Factors
that must be considered are the time elapsed between arrest and
search9 3 and whether the items are in danger of being dis-
Giacona v. United States, 257 F2d 450 (5th Cir. 1958) ; Mills v. United States,
251 F.2d 464 (4th Cir. 1958) ; United States v. White, 237 F. Supp. 644 (E.D.
Va. 1964); Maxwell v. Stephens, 229 F. Supp. 205 (E.D. Ark. 1964); United
States v. Grasso, 225 F. Supp. 161 (W.D. Pa. 1964); United States v. Wai
Lau, 215 F. Supp. 684 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) ; United States v. Tate, 209 F. Supp.
357 (D. Del. 1962); United States v. Monroe, 205 F. Supp. 175 (E.D. La.
1962) ; United States v. Royster, 204 F. Supp. 760 (N.D. Ohio 1961).
87. Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948).
88. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
89. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964). For a discussion of this case and
the validity of a felony arrest in general, see 17 S.C.L. Rev. 553 (1965).
See also, Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960) ; Miller v. United States,
357 U.S. 301 (1958); Accarino v. United States, 179 F.2d 456 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
90. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963) ; United States ex rel Boucher v.
Reincke, 341 F.2d 977 (2d Cir. 1965) ; Ralph v. Pepersack, 335 F.2d 128 (4th
Cir. 1964); Wiggs v. United States, 304 F.2d 876 (5th Cir. 1962); It re
Phoenix Cereal Beverage Co., 58 F.2d 953 (2d Cir. 1932). If the officers have
no probable cause for arrest, the arrest is invalid and evidence seized in a
search incident thereto is inadmissible. See, e.g., Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89
(1964) ; Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960).
91. Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493 (1958) ; United States v. Lefkowitz,
285 U.S. 452 (1932); Worthington v. United States, 166 F.2d 557 (6th Cir.
1948) ; Papani v. United States, 84 F.2d 160 (9th Cir. 1936) ; United States v.
Scott 149 F. Supp. 837 (D.D.C. 1957) ; United States v. Alberti, 120 F. Supp.
171 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
92. Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964); United States ex rel Clark
v. Maroney, 339 F.2d 710 (3d Cir. 1965).
93. See, e.g., Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964) (Search of a
car which was not undertaken until the person who occupied it had been ar-
rested and taken into custody and the car had been towed into a garage was too
remote as to time to be incident to arrest); Williams v. United States, 323
F.2d 90 (10th Cir. 1963) (Search by federal agents made several days after
defendant's arrest was not sustainable as incident to a lawful arrest) ; United
States v. Scott, 149 F. Supp. 837 (D.D.C. 1957) (An illegal seizure of articles
from defendant's apartment could not be made legal by returning defendant
already under arrest to his apartment prior to taking him to the police station).
12
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turbed 9 4 Similarly, an arrest may not be delayed until an indi-
vidual is in a desired location so that a search incident to an
arrest may be made.9 5
The permissible area of search is limited to the area under the
control of the person arrested, 96 but this does not mean that it
is limited to the immediate place where the arrest occurred. 7
Thus, the search of an entire apartment is valid although the
arrest was made in the living room,98 as is a search of a barn
from which the defendant fled although the actual arrest was
made outside the barn.9 9 If the area is clearly not within the
control of the arrested person, however, the search is invalid.1 09
Finally, the search must be confined to those items connected
with the crime for which the defendant is arrested and instru-
ments with which it was committed, or with which the accused
might escape or bring harm to the arresting officer.101 However,
if the search uncovers evidence of crimes other than the one for
which the accused is arrested, this evidence may be used against
him for the prosecution of crimes so discovered.
0 2
2. Immediate Necessity. Immediate necessity exists when the
object will shortly be removed or destroyed. 0 3 Probable cause
94. Sherman v. United States, 219 F.2d 282 (5th Cir. 1955) ; Rent v. United
States, 209 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1954).
95. McKnight v. United States, 183 F.2d 977 (D.C. Cir. 1950) ; United States
v. Alberti, 120 F. Supp. 171 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
96. Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964) ; United States v. Rabino-
witz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950) ; Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947) ; Ker-
nich v. United States, 242 F.2d 818 (8th Cir. 1957) ; United States v. Fortier,
207 F. Supp. 516 (D. Conn. 1962).
97. Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948); United States v. Papani,
84 F.2d 160 (9th Cir. 1936); United States v. Burke, 217 F. Supp. 896 (D.
Mass. 1963).
98. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
99. Papani v. United States, 84 F.2d 160 (9th Cir. 1936).
100. Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925) (Search of a home of a
person arrested several blocks away is not incident to an arrest) ; Steeber v.
United States, 198 F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1952) (Where the defendant was ar-
rested away from his home on a charge other than moonshining, a search dis-
covering a still was not incident to a lawful arrest) ; United States ex rel
Holloway v. Reincke, 229 F. Supp. 132 (D. Conn. 1964) (Once an accused is
under arrest and in custody, search made in another place without a warrant is
not incident to the arrest.)
101. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960) ; Agnello v. United States,
269 U.S. 20 (1925) ; Taglavore v. United States, 291 F.2d 262 (9th Cir. 1961).
102. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); Collins v. United States,
289 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1961).
103. See, e.g., McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948).
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must exist for the search, but such cause is not sufficient stand-
ing alone.' 0 4
The most important situation involving immediate necessity
is where the goods sought are in an automobile. 10° The great
mobility of the automobile makes it very possible that the object
sought will be permanently removed, and a search without a
warrant is justified.106 Such a search is lawful even if the auto-
mobile is stopped on a routine check and there is contraband
within the view of the officer.'
07
If there is no immediate necessity the search is not justified.
If there is time to obtain a warrant,108 or when there is no dan-
ger of losing the object sought, 10 9 immediate necessity ceases
to exist and the search can be conducted only pursuant to a
warrant.
3. Consent or Waiver. When the defendant consents to or
invites an inspection, he waives his constitutional right.110 This
consent must be voluntarily given and cannot be obtained by
coercion, either actual or implied."' Actual coercion has been
found from an officers badge," 2 a demand rather than a request
to search," 3 and fear for one's family. 41  Implied coercion has
104. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493 (1958); Catalanotte v.
United States, 208 F.2d 264 (6th Cir. 1953).
105. See notes 57 to 62 supra and accompanying text.
106. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949); United States v.
O'Leary, 201 F. Supp. 296 (E.D. Tenn. 1962).
107. Petteway v. United States, 261 F.2d 53 (4th Cir. 1953). But see Ker-
shner v. Boles, 212 F. Supp. 9 (N.D. W. Va. 1963) where the opening and
searching of a locked automobile trunk after a routine check for a driver's
license was held to be illegal.
108. See, e.g., Cervantes v. United States, 263 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1959).
109. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948); Patenotte v.
United States, 266 F.2d 647 (5th Cir. 1959).
110. Ruud v. United States, 347 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1965); Nelson v. Cali-
fornia, 346 F.2d 73 (9th Cir. 1965); Chapman v. United States, 346 F.2d 383
(9th Cir. 1965); Davis v. California, 341 F.2d 982 (9th Cir. 1965); United
States v. Saka, 339 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1964) ; Grillo v. United States, 336 F.2d
211 (1st Cir. 1964); United States v. Rivera, 321 F.2d 704 (2d Cir. 1963);
United States v. Lane, 230 F. Supp. 950 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) ; Simmons v. Bomar,
230 F. Supp. 226 (M.D. Tenn. 1964).
111. United States v. Como, 340 F.2d 891 (2d Cir. 1965); United States v.
Page, 302 F.2d 31 (9th Cir. 1962) ; Conida v. United States, 250 F.2d 822 (5th
Cir. 1958) ; Judd v. United States, 190 F.2d 649 (D.C. Cir. 1951) ; Nelson v.
Hancock, 239 F. Supp. 857 (D.N.H. 1965) ; United States v. Katz, 238 F. Supp.
689 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). For a case where the psychological compulsion was not
so present as to vitiate consent to search and seize, see Rees v. Peyton, 341
F.2d 859 (4th Cir. 1965).
112. See e.g., Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948); Amos v. United
States, 2 55 U.S. 313 (1921).
113. See, e.g., United States v. DeCiccio, 190 F. Supp. 487 (E.D.N.Y. 1961).
114. See, e.g., United States v. Alberti, 120 F. Supp. 171 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
Vol. 17
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been found when the defendant, knowing the item sought to be
on the premises, consented to the search." 5 Moreover, the con-
sent must be unequivocal, specific, and freely and intelligently
given.116 This means that the accused must know the searcher's
identity and purpose.'1 7 Therefore there can be no consent if
the officer obtains permission to search by deception. 118 Neither
can an agent waive the constitutional rights of his principal, 119
but a wife who is in sufficient charge of the premises can consent
for her husband.
120
Using consent as the basis for a search without a warrant is
a dangerous practice, and law enforcement officials should resort
to it only in cases of extreme necessity. Logic makes it clear
that anyone who has anything to hide will probably not volun-
tarily consent, and the federal courts have taken a hard look at
evidence obtained by an alleged -waiver of the constitutional
right. Any officer making such a search must be prepared to
support it with clear proof that consent was voluntarily given.
D. Warrants-Acguisition and Execution
The fourth amendment provides that no warrant shall be
issued but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirma-
tion, and that such warrant shall particularly describe the place
to be searched and the thing to be seized. In Aguilar v. Texas' 2'1
115. Higgins v. United States, 209 F.2d 819 (D.C. Cir. 1954) ; United States
v. Martin, 176 F. Supp. 487 (E.D.N.Y. 1961). However, if the defendant does
not know of the contraband there is no implied coertion. United States v. De-
Ciccio, 190 F. Supp. 487 (E.D.N.Y. 1961).
116. Maxwell v. Stephens, 348 F.2d 325 (8th Cir. 1965); Weed v. United
States, 340 F.2d 827 (10th Cir. 1965) ; United States v. Page, 302 F.2d 81 (9th
Cir. 1962) ; United States v. Minor, 117 F. Supp. 697 (E.D. Okla. 1953). The
presumption against waiver of a constitutional right makes it necessary to show
consent by clear and positive proof. United States v. Como, 340 F.2d 891 (2d
Cir. 1965) ; United States v. Katz, 238 F. Supp. 689 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
117. See, e.g., United States v. Reckis, 119 F. Supp. 687 (D. Mass. 1954).
118. Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921); Gatewood v. United
States, 209 F.2d 789 (D.C. Cir. 1953) ; United States v. Martin, 176 F. Supp.
262 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). But see United States v. Lane, 230 F. Supp. 750
(S.D.N.Y. 1964).
119. United States v. Ruffner, 51 F2d 579 (D. Md. 1931).
120. Stein v. United States, 166 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1948); United States v.
Sergio, 21 F. Supp. 553 (E.D.N.Y. 1938). But if the wife is merely acting as
the agent of the husband she cannot consent. Cofer v. United States, 37 F.2d
677 (5th Cir. 1930); United States v. Derman, 66 F. Supp. 511 (S.D.N.Y.
1946). If voluntary consent was given by the accused's mother to search home
that she owned, consent was binding on the defendant. Rees v. Peyton, 341
F.2d 859 (4th Cir. 1965); United States ex rel McKenna v. Myers, 232 F.
Supp. 65 (E.D. Pa. 1964). But see Reeves v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary,
346 F.2d 915 (4th Cir. 1965).
121. 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
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the Supreme Court held that the standard for obtaining a search
warrant is the same under the fourth and fourteenth amend-
ments. Thus the federal standard is made applicable to the
states in still a further way.
1. Probable Cause. The constitutional requirement for prob-
able cause for the issuance of a search warrant has been judi-
cially expanded to require probable cause for a search without
a warrant. In both cases, however, the standards are the same.122
Probable cause is a fact question to be determined from the
standpoint of the officer, with his skill and knowledge, rather
than from the standpoint of the average citizen under similar
circumstances. 123  In construing the term the United States
Supreme Court has said:
In dealing with probable cause, however, as the name im-
plies, we deal with probabilities. They are not technical;
they are factual and practical considerations of everyday
life on which prudent men, not legal technicians, act. The
standard of proof is accordingly correlative to what must
be proved.
The substance of all definitions of probable cause is a rea-
sonable ground for belief of guilt .... Probable cause exists
where the facts and circumstances within... [the officers]
knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy
information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a
man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense had
been committed.
124
Mere suspicion that a crime has been committed is not suffi-
cient.126 However, the facts establishing probable cause need not
122. United States v. Peisner, 311 F.2d 94 (4th Cir. 1962). See also Smith
v. United States, 254 F.2d 751 (D.C. Cir. 1958); United States v. Bosch, 209
F. Supp. 15 (E.D. Mich. 1962).
123. United States v. Sebo, 101 F.2d 889 (7th Cir. 1939).
124. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949). See also Flores v.
United States, 234 F.2d 604 (5th Cir. 1956) ; United States v. Egorov, 222 F.
Supp. 862 (E.D.N.Y. 1963); United States v. Cooperstein, 221 F. Supp. 522
(D. Mass. 1963) ; United States v. Phelps, 203 F. Supp. 180 (N.D. Fla. 1962);
United States v. O'Leary, 201 F. Supp. 926 (E.D. Tenn. 1962).
125. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964) ; Brinegar v. United States, 338
U.S. 160 (1949); Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41 (1933); United
States v. Dixon, 334 F.2d 322 (6th Cir. 1964); Plazola v. United States, 291
F.2d 56 (9th Cir. 1961) ; Smith v. United States, 264 F.2d 469 (8th Cir. 1959) ;
United States v. Pepe, 209 F. Supp. 329 (D. Del. 1962) ; United States v. Betz,
205 F. Supp. 927 (E.D. Mich. 1962); United States v. Sims, 201 F. Supp. 405
(M.D. Tenn. 1962) ; United States v. Law, 190 F. Supp. 100 (S.D. Cal. 1960);
United States v. Schwartz, 151 F. Supp. 399 (W.D. Pa. 1957).
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be within the personal knowledge of the arresting officer; a
combination of information and personal knowledge may raise
an inference beyond opinion, suspicion, and conjecture to the
reasonable probability required for the warrant. 126 All evidence
within the officer's knowledge may be considered in determining
probable cause, although the evidence is not legally competent
in the trial. 21 Thus, hearsay is sufficient support,128 provided
it is corroborated 29 by facts within the officers knowledge tend-
ing to credit the hearsay or lead a reasonably cautious individual
to believe that it was true.180 The corroboration may be from
the information of a reliable informant.' 8 ' If such is the case
it is necessary to establish only that he is reliable, and failure
to name him has been upheld by the Supreme Court.
132
Probable cause is, then, a reasonable belief in the guilt of the
accused. Although any reliable information that would lead a
reasonably cautious man to believe that an offense is being or
has been committed is sufficient, law enforcement officials must
be aware of possible pitfalls that would be grounds for holding
a warrant illegally obtained for lack of probable cause.
2. Affidavit. The issuance of a search warrant must be sup-
ported by an affidavit which states facts showing probable
cause. 133 Although it is not necessary that these facts be legally
competent evidence, they must be more than a surmise of which
126. United States v. Hill, 114 F. Supp. 441 (D.D.C. 1953).
127. Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959). This case overruled
Grau v. United States, 287 U.S. 124 (1932) which had established the rule that
probable cause had to be based on legally competent evidence. A recent case in
line with the Draper decision is Biondo v. United States, 348 F.2d 272 (8th
Cir. 1965).
128. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960) ; Trevino v. Texas, 326 F.2d
403 (5th Cir. 1964) ; Jackson v. United States, 302 F.2d 194 (D.C. Cir. 1962) ;
United States v. Cooperstein, 221 F. Supp. 522 (D. Mass. 1963) ; United States
v. Haskins, 213 F. Supp. 551 (E.D. Tenn. 1962).
129. United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965); Jones v. United
States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960); Chin Kay v. United States, 311 F.2d 317 (9th
Cir. 1962); Gilliam v. United States, 189 F.2d 321 (6th Cir. 1951).
130. United States v. Joseph, 278 F.2d 504 (3d Cir. 1960) ; Gilliam v. United
States, 189 F2d 321 (6th Cir. 1951); United States v. Conway, 217 F. Supp.
853 (D. Mass. 1962); United States v. Jordan, 216 F. Supp. 310 (S.D. Ill.
1963); United States v. Malugin, 200 F. Supp. 764 (M.D. Tenn. 1961).
131. Napolitano v. United States, 340 F.2d 313 (1st Cir. 1965) ; Ventresca v.
United States, 324 F.2d 864 (1st Cir. 1963) ; Overton v. United States, 275
F.2d 897 (D.C. Cir. 1960); United States v. Jordan, 216 F. Supp. 310 (S.D.
Ill. 1963). But see Worthington v. United States, 166 F.2d 557 (6th Cir. 1948).
132. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960); Draper v. United States,
358 U.S. 307 (1959).
133. United States v. Lassoff, 147 F. Supp. 944 (E.D. Ky. 1957).
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the affiant has no personal knowledge. 13 4 The test of the affi-
davit is its validity on its face; extrinsic evidence cannot be used
to support it. 13  Only facts showing probable cause need appear
in the affidavit, and the place to be searched or the things to be
seized need not be shown. It is hard to imagine, however, a
showing of probable cause without including these facts.13 6
3. Description of Place To Be Searched. The requirement that
the place to be searched be particularly described is satisfied if
the description identifies the place with sufficient clarity to
enable the officer to identify and locate it with a reasonable
degree of effort.
3 7
Some confusion has arisen with regard to apartments. The
rule apparently is that if a search of a number of apartments
in one building is desired, there must be a warrant based on
probable cause for each apartment, unless the building is occu-
pied by only one family.13
Although the amendment states that the persons and items
to be seized must be described, the courts have not interpreted
this to mean that the owner or occupant of the premises be
named. If the premises are described with sufficient particu-
larity, the warrant is not invalid for failure to name the resi-
dent.13
4. Description of Items To Be Seized. The general rule is
that unless the item seized is described in the warrant the seizure
is illegal and the evidence inadmissible. 140 General exploratory
searches are prohibited. 14 1 As a practical matter it is not always
possible to describe the items to be seized with absolute certainty.
The courts have recognized this problem and have allowed some
generality, requiring only that the items be identifiable under
134. Marderosian v. United States, 337 F.2d 759 (1st Cir. 1964); United
States v. Dixon, 334 F.2d 322 (6th Cir. 1964); United States v. Lassoff, 147
F. Supp. 944 (E.D. Ky. 1957); United States v. Nichols, 89 F. Supp. 953
(W.D. Ark. 1950).
135. Poldo v. United States, 55 F.2d 866 (9th Cir. 1932); United States v.
Sims, 201 F. Supp. 405 (M.D. Tenn. 1962).
136. Lowery v. United States, 161 F.2d 30 (8th Cir. 1947); United States
v. Wroblewski, 105 F.2d 444 (7th Cir. 1939).
137. United States v. Thomas, 216 F. Supp. 942 (N.D. Cal. 1963).
138. United States v. Hinton, 219 F.2d 424 (7th Cir. 1955).
139. Dixon v. United States, 211 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1954); United States
v. Leach, 24 F.2d 866 (9th Cir. 1932).
140. Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476 (1965); Cofer v. United States, 37
F.2d 677 (5th Cir. 1930); United States v. Spallino, 21 F2d 567 (W.D.N.Y.
1927).
141. Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476 (1965) ; cases cited note 80, supra.
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the description.142  Recently, however, the Supreme Court con-
siderably restricted this rule. In Stanford 'v. Texas143 the Court
held that the constitutional requirement that warrants must
particularly describe the items to be seized is to be accorded the
most scrupulous exactitude when the items are books, and the
basis for their seizure is the ideas which they contain. The
Court did not decide whether a generalized description would
have been invalid if the items seized had been narcotics or liquor,
but merely held that a warrant generally describing such non-
contraband articles as books and pamphlets was constitutionally
intolerable. In view of the increased protection which the Court
has extended in recent years, it is likely that the rule will become
one of strict description to all items, and any generality will
render the warrant invalid.
There are exceptions to the rule requiring that the items to
be seized be described: fruits of the crime, instrumentalities by
which the crime was committed, weapons and means by which
the accused may escape or do harm to the arresting officer, or
property the possession of which is a crime may always be seized
if the search was otherwise legal. Objects that are subjects of
another crime may also be seized for use in a subsequent prose-
cution.144
5. Manner of Entry Pursuant To A Warrant. Forced entries
are authorized under a federal statute, provided the officer an-
nounces his name and purpose and is refused admittance. The
statute further provides that the officer may break any door or
window if necessary for his own liberation. 45
As for a non-forceful but unannounced entry there is some
conflict. If there is an immediate necessity because the goods
sought might be destroyed, such an entry may be permissible. 46
142. Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498 (1928); United States v. Joseph,
174 F. Supp. 539 (E.D. Pa. 1959).
143. 379 U.S. 476 (1965).
144. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947); Porter v. United States,
335 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1964) ; United States v. Eisner, 297 F.2d 595 (6th Cir.
1962); Johnson v. United States, 293 F.2d 539 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Palmer v.
United States, 203 F.2d 66 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
145. 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (1950) : The officer may break open any outer or inner
door or window of a house, or any part of a house, or anything therein to exe-
cute a search warrant, if, after notice of his authority and purpose, he is re-
fused admittance or when necessary to liberate himself or a person aiding him
in the execution of the warrant.
See also Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301 (1958).
146. Ker v. California, 372 U.S. 23 (1963) ; United States ex rel Turco v.
Dross, 224 F. Supp. 142 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). In Ker the agents desired to search
the apartment of one suspected of violation of the narcotics laws. Acting under
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The usual situation of this type is when the items sought are
narcotics. Such an unannounced entry is on the fringes of the
statute, and undoubtedly the courts will rigidly scrutinize the
search. The rule requiring announcement is based on a federal
statute and not on the constitution, and is therefore not binding
on the states. The states can set their own standard and such
standard will not be overturned unless it violates fundamental
standards of fairness and reasonableness. 147 The better view,
however, is to prohibit such a search except in unusual situations.
. Applicability To The States
Since 1961 the Supreme Court has moved toward total applica-
tion of the federal standard to the states. Mapp v. Ohio148 was
the first giant step. Aguilar v. Texas149 made the federal stand-
ard for acquisition of a search warrant applicable to the states.
Beok- v. Ohio °50 held the federal standard of probable cause to
be controlling. And finally, Stanford v. Texas'51 made the
particularity of the description binding on the states. This
trend is not likely to reverse and it therefore becomes imperative
that the state courts look to and follow the federal law, regardless
of what the previous state law may have been.
II. Tim SoUTH CAnoLiNA STAmARD
Since the federal standard of search and seizure is now appli-
cable to the states, it is necessary to examine South Carolina
law, rules, and practices in order to determine wherein con-
stitutional rights might be violated. In so doing an analysis
of the statutory and case law is essential, as well as an examina-
tion of the law as interpreted and applied by local law enforce-
ment agencies.
A. Statutory Law
The language used in the state constitution prohibiting unrea-
sonable searches and seizures is identical to that used in the
a warrant issued for probable cause, they obtained a pass key from the landlord
and entered the apartment taking the tenants by surprise, and found a brick
of marijuana on the kitchen counter. The search was held valid and the evidence
admissible.
147. Ker v. California, 372 U.S. 23 (1963).
148. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
149. 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
150. 379 U.S. 89 (1964).
151. 379 U.S. 476 (1965).
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federal constitution. 152 The state statute is, however, more
restrictive than the provisions of either constitution:
Magistrates may issue warrants to make search and seizure
of suspected places and to arrest suspected persons and
seize their property. Such warrants shall issue only for
stolen property. Such warrants must be supported by oath
or affirmation of the party applying for the warrant, and
shall set forth fully and particularly all the facts upon
which application is based, and shall specially designate
the place, the object of the search, and the name of the per-
son suspected and who is to be arrested.
No such warrant shall issue except in the cases and with
the formalities herein provided.'53
The limitation that a warrant may issue only for stolen mer-
chandise is not exclusive. Another statute provides that contra-
band liquor may be the subject of a search and seizure. 15 4 But
this statute is also restrictive in that it makes a search of a
dwelling house for liquor illegal if it is conducted at night, with-
out regard to the reasonableness of the search. The better rule
would seem to be that the time the search is conducted should
be only a factor in the determination of reasonableness, and
should not, per se, invalidate an otherwise reasonable search.
A recent enactment, contained in section 32-1455 of the South
Carolina Code, allows for search and seizure of narcotics, bar-
titurates or other drugs which require a prescription. Other than
these three categories, a search warrant can be issued in South
Carolina only in several minor and relatively unimportant
situations.'5 5
These restrictive limitations on the permissive areas of search
are unnecessary and place an undue hardship on law enforce-
ment agencies concerned with crimes other than those in which
stolen goods, contraband liquors or narcotics are involved. Thus
there is no authority in the state for the issuance of a warrant to
152. S.C. CowsT. art. I, § 16: The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures
shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the person or thing to be seized.
153. S.C. CODE ANN. § 43-201 (1962) (Emphasis added.)
154. S.C. CODE ANN. § 4-414 (1962).
155. S.C. CODE ANN. § 6-15 (1962) (Cruelty to animals); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 54-353 (1962) (Missing seamen); S.C. CODE ANN. § 58-615 (1962) (Ex-
plosives kept on railroads).
NoTs1965]
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search the premises of a suspected murderer or distributor of por-
nographic literature, or the premises of offenders in which a
search for the fruits of the crime would be permitted under the
federal statute,156 provided probable cause existed.
The state statute further expands the constitutional protection
by requiring that the warrant must "specially designate the
place" to be searched. Although the term has never been con-
strued by the court, it apparently means that the exact place,
with no generality, must be named. The state and federal con-
stitutions require that the warrant "particularly describe the
place," and the federal courts have interpreted this to mean a
description that would enable an executing officer to locate it
with a reasonable degree of certainty.
The statutes are more restrictive of law enforcement than is
required under either the state or federal constitutions. They
should be amended to allow searches in a great variety of situa-
tions other than stolen goods, contraband liquors or narcotics and
to allow more generality in the description of the place to be
searched. Law enforcement would be facilitated and the public
would benefit, without a correspondingly detrimental effect to
the rights of the individual. Adequate safeguards of his rights
are provided by the constitution.
B. South Carolina Case Law
Prior to Mapp v. Ohio, South Carolina was one of the ma-
jority of states which held that the fourth and fourteenth
amendments did not impose the federal exclusionary rule on the
states, and that evidence obtained in an illegal search and seizure
was admissible. 157 There have been no cases on the issue since
Mapp, but the South Carolina Supreme Court has recognized
the rule that evidence so obtained is inadmissible. 158
The most recent case in this state on search and seizure is
State v. Hill,5" a case dealing with probable cause. Here a
warrant to search for contraband liquor was issued on the basis
156. Fan. R. CRar. P. 41 (b) provides the grounds for issuance of a search
warrant. This section allows for search and seizure of "fruits of the crime".
There are other special situations where search warrants are issued.
157. State v. Prescott, 125 S.C. 22, 117 S.E. 637 (1923) ; State v. Kanellos,
122 S.C. 351, 115 S.E. 636 (1923); State v. Harley, 107 S.C. 351, 92 S.E. 1034
(1917).
158. State v. Morris, 243 S.C. 225, 133 S.E.2d 744 (1963) in which the search
was held legal and therefore the Mapp rule was not applicable.
159. 245 S.C. 76, 138 S.E.2d 829 (1964).
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of an affidavit which stated only that the affiant was informed
by an informer and had reason to believe that defendant's resi-
dence contained illegal whisky. In reversing the conviction the
court held that an affidavit of information and belief must set
forth the sources of affiant's information, and that the affidavit
here was devoid of factual allegations necessary to support a
finding of probable cause. The court recognized and agreed with
the rationale that an informant need not be named, but stated
that it was necessary that the affidavit set forth facts that the
affiant knew as a matter of personal knowledge. Specifically,
the affidavit must show what the affiants had been told by the
informers, and enough information about the informers for the
magistrate to form an opinion as to their credibility. The
court's holding is on all fours with the federal rule, and aligns
South Carolina with the federal standard regarding probable
cause.
The remaining case law is of little importance. The cases are
far from numerous, and most of them turn upon well established
points in which there is no conflict between the state and federal
standards.
0. State Praotice and Procedure
In order to determine the actual practices used in South Caro-
lina a survey of various law enforcement agencies was conducted
by the writer. 60 This survey revealed various discrepancies in
160. The survey was sent out to the police chiefs of the ten largest cities
and the sheriffs of the forty-six counties. Thirty of the surveys were answered
and returned. The author wishes to express his appreciation to the cooperating
agencies. The survey is set out below with a compilation of results in the
appropriate column.
SURVEY OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE PROCEDURES IN
SOUTH CAROLINA
PART I-The questions in this part are objective and require only yes or no
answers. Please do not qualify your answers. Provision is made
in Parts II and III for qualifications.
Yes No
6 24 1. Do officers/agents in your department search the premises when
making an arrest under a valid arrest warrant?
1 29 2. Are officers/agents allowed to carry around blank warrants of
arrest or search?
28 2 3. Must the person to be searched or arrested under the warrant be
named?
2 28 4. Is "occupants" a sufficient naming in the warrant?
28 2 5. Is the officer allowed to enter by force if he possesses a valid
search warrant?
30 0 6. If yes, must he announce his name and purpose before forcing
his way in?
15 15 7. Can the officer enter by force under a valid search warrant if no
one is at home?
NOTE~S1965]
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the application of the rules, and some of the practices followed
would definitely provide grounds for constitutional objections.
In other situations the state agencies were unduly restricting
themselves. The responses may not have been completely accu-
rate due to the inherent limitations of the survey, but they pro-
vide an adequate basis for study.
The rules discussed in the following material are based on the
federal standard, but in South Carolina these rules are limited
by the statute which restricts issuance of warrants to searches
for stolen goods, contraband liquors or narcotics.
Under the federal rules, a limited search without a warrant
that is incident to a lawful arrest is legal. A lawful arrest exists
9 20 8. Are non-forceable but unannounced entries permitted under au-
thority of a search warrant?
29 1 9. Is a search warrant required when the building to be searched is
not the home but outbuildings such as barns, greenhouses, etc.?
27 3 10. Is a search warrant required when the place to be searched is a
hotel or motel room?
23 7 11. Is a search warrant required when the building to be searched is
a business establishment rather than a home?
19 10 12. Do officers in your department stop and search automobiles with-
out a warrant?
3 27 13. Can the officer search without a warrant on the sole grounds that
it would not be practical for him to obtain one?
6 24 14. Is the officer ever allowed to search without a warrant even though
he could easily obtain one?
15 15 15. Can arrests be delayed by officers in your department until a sus-
pect is in a particular location so that a search incidental to the
arrest can be made.
PART II-The following broad questions should be answered on the attached
sheets. You do not have to limit your answers to the questions
asked. Please be specific and add any details you desire.
1. What is the procedure for officers/agents in your department for obtaining
warrants of search or arrest? Is the officer required to make an affidavit?
Must he sign it? What must the affidavit contain? Who issues the warrant?
Please enclose an affidavit and warrant form if available.
2. If a warrant is desired after normal working hours, what is the procedure
for obtaining it?
3. What information must the officer have before he can obtain a search war-
rant? Is the information of an informant sufficient? Must the informant be
named?
4. What must the warrant contain? Name of persons to be searched or ar-
rested? Place? Items to be seized?
5. Upon what reason is the officer allowed to search without a warrant? Is
suspicion sufficient?
6. If a person is arrested in his home, can the officer search the premises in-
cidental to the arrest? How extensive may this search be? Are any limita-
tions imposed on the search? What items may be seized?
7. What is the procedure in your department for searching the person of a
suspect. Must a warrant be obtained?
PART IlI-Add any statements or facts regarding search and seizure pro-
cedures in your department even though they have not been spe-
cifically raised by the above questions. Also, any questions you
may have in this regard will be appreciated. Your questions and
answers will be used in stating a constitutional standard for
search and seizure in South Carolina.
[V9ol. 17
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when it is pursuant to a properly executed arrest warrant, or
if there is probable cause for the arrest. In either case, a search
incident thereto can be conducted provided it does not violate
the limitations as to time, place, or items seized. The survey
revealed that a majority of the responding agencies do not allow
such a search. A recognition of the federal rule would greatly
increase the permissible scope of searches in this state because
a search incident to a lawful arrest would not be limited to
stolen articles, liquor or narcotics. Adoption of the "search inci-
dent to arrest" rule is therefore highly desirable.
A blank warrant, signed and completed as to formalities, but
with space for necessary particulars to be filled in by the officer
-when he desires to search is clearly unconstitutional. Such a
warrant is invalid because it substitutes a decision of the search-
ing officer for the impartial judgment of a judge or magistrate.
The federal courts have many times held that the judgment of
the latter is the only permissible determination of probable
cause.161 Only one South Carolina agency reported allowing
this practice, but it is clearly a violation of the federal standard.
The federal courts have held it unnecessary to name the owner
or occupant of a dwelling house. Since the language of the state
constitution is identical to that of the federal, no different rule
should be applied on a constitutional basis. The South Carolina
statute, however, provides that the search warrant shall "set
forth... the name of the person suspected and who is to be
arrested." The statute seems to combine two different proced-
ures, search and arrest, and to presume that one necessarily leads
to and is an integral part of the other. This is not necessarily
true. Under the federal law a search warrant can be based on
evidence not legally competent at a trial, and competent evidence
discovered in such a search is admissible. But an officer cannot
arrest a suspect on hearsay or other incompetent evidence. The
statute could constitutionally allow for a search of a dwelling
without naming the occupant if the search is not necessarily
calculated to lead to an arrest. The evidence so discovered may
or may not be a ground for an arrest, but if the search is con-
ducted subject to the proper safeguards of probable cause, the
rights of the individual are not violated and the process of law
enforcement is greatly facilitated.
161. See, e.g., Biondo v. United States, 348 F2d 272 (8th Cir. 1965) ; Hollins
v. United States, 338 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1964).
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The statute in this instance is extremely ambiguous. There
are no state cases dealing with the issue of naming the owner,
but there is apparently substantial uniformity among state
agencies in believing that such a requirement exists. The better
rule, however, is that followed in the federal courts. Under this
"name unnecessary" rule a search can be conducted under the
terra "occupants" or "John Doe" as long as the place is described
with sufficient particularity. A different rule might be desirable
with regard to arrest, but the distinction between these two pro-
cedures should be maintained. The ambiguity of the statute
makes it impossible to state whether a search warrant could or
could not be issued without naming the occupants, and the safest
practice would be to name him when possible.
The procedure followed in this state with regard to the use of
force in executing a search warrant is consistent with the federal
standard. The South Carolina statute'6 2 is similar to the federal
law, and most state agencies follow the rule that the officer must
announce his name and purpose before forcing his way in. A
further federal limitation is that he must allow sufficient time
for response by the party to be searched and his entry must be
refused.
The survey revealed substantial conflict among both state and
local agencies as to whether an officer can enter by force if all
occupants are absent. The federal rule is that an agent or officer
cannot enter peacefully or by force if the residents are not at
home or if the house is vacant. Despite the fact that a violation
of this rule renders the search invalid, fifteen state agencies
permit such a search.
The local officials were likewise divided on the issue of non-
forceable but unannounced entries when the occupants are at
home. The federal rule may allow such an unannounced entry
where the goods might be destroyed or there is some other
immediate necessity. In any case, the United States Supreme
Court has upheld such a state search if it is otherwise reasonable.
State agencies are in substantial agreement as to the necessity
of the warrant when the building is an outbuilding, with only
one county holding that a warrant is not required. The federal
standard is explicit that outbuildings as well as dwellings are
protected. Of course, a building "within the curtilage" can be
searched pursuant to a lawful search of the dwelling house. The
problem is minimized in this state by a provision in the warrant
162. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 10-1712 (1962).
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NOTES
used by most local agencies allowing a search of the dwelling
house and buildings appurtenant thereto.
Three state agencies do not require a warrant if the place
to be searched is a hotel or motel room. This is clearly contrary
to the federal standard. A search so conducted without a war-
rant, or not in one of the three situations where the search is
justified without a warrant, is invalid. If the room has been
vacated, however, the owner of the establishment can consent to
the search and no objection can be made.
Where the building to be searched is a business rather than a
home, a number of state agencies do not require a warrant. The
federal rule invalidating such a search, unless such business is
open to the public, is the sounder procedure.
Considerable uncertainty exists among law enforcement divi-
sions as to searches of automobiles. Although a search warrant
should be procured whenever possible, officers are not precluded
from reasonably stopping automobiles on routine checks. The
requirements as to reasonable search with regard to automobiles
is not as stringent as it is to dwelling houses. 163
The impracticality of obtaining a warrant is not, of itself, a
basis for searching without a warrant. It may be considered in
the determination of reasonableness, but an officer should never
search without a warrant on the sole ground that it would not
be practical for him to obtain one. If the officer could easily
obtain a warrant he should always do so, even though search
without a warrant might be justified under the circumstances.
Whether an arrest can be delayed by officers until a suspect
is in a particular location so that a search incidental to the arrest
can be made created a sharp division of opinion among local
agencies in those few jurisdictions that allow such a search. The
federal rule is clear that such a delay makes the search invalid,
and any contrary procedure should be avoided by state officials.
A search of the person of a suspect cannot be conducted with-
out a warrant unless the person is arrested. If he is arrested, the
necessity for the warrant is extinguished and evidence found
on him is admissible provided the arrest was lawful. This rule
is recognized and followed by the majority of the agencies sur-
veyed.
In regard to a search for contraband liquor, the printed war-
rant forms of a number of agencies permit the search to be made
163. See notes 57 to 62 smpra and accompanying text.
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by day or night. This is a direct violation of South Carolina
Code section 4-414. Although this statutory provision is con-
sidered unsound because of its unnecessary restrictiveness, it is
the law, and searches of dwellings for contraband whiskey at
night are illegal per se.
D. Affidavits and Warrants
The printed affidavit forms used by most of the agencies
responding to the survey are weak and should be revised. The
federal rule, and the rule of the state by statute, 164 is that the
affidavit must set forth sufficient facts within the personal
knowledge of the officer to show probable cause for the issuance
of the warrant. A mere statement that the officer is informed or
has reason to believe is insufficient; reasons for this belief must
be set forth. These facts do not have to constitute evidence that
would be competent at a trial, but to justify issuance they must
be more than mere suspicion or conjecture. This requirement was
apparently not enforced in South Carolina until the case of
State v. Hlill,66 where the court held invalid a warrant in which
the affidavit was based solely on "information and belief." A
printed affidavit form very similar to the one in this case is
used by most of the counties and cities questioned. 166 There are,
however, a few notable exceptions. The decision of the Hill case
prompted Greenville County to draft an excellent new affidavit
form which provides a space in which the requesting officer
164. S.C. CODE ANN. § 4-415 (1962).
165. 245 S.C. 76, 138 S.E.2d 829 (1964).
166. A typical affidavit for a warrant to search and seize illegal whiskey is
shown here:
Personally Appeared , who being duly
sworn, deposes and says that he is informed by
and verily believes from such information, and his own observation, that in
the premises known as
in County, S. C., there is now deposited, stored and kept
contraband liquors, in violation of law, to wit: a lot of Whiskey, Brandy, Wine,
Rum, Gin and Beer, in barrels, demijohns, bottles and other vessels, and that
said intoxicating and contraband liquors are kept stored and deposited by
his aiders and abettors, without a permit in
violation of the laws of the State.
Wherefore, depondent prays that a search warrant may issue, commanding
the search of said premises and their appurtenances, and that such contraband
liquors may be brought before this Court, and such action taken concerning
the same, as authorized by law.
[Vol. 17
28
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 5 [1964], Art. 6
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol17/iss5/6
may set forth the facts showing probable cause.167 Similar out-
standing forms are used by Spartanburg and Marion Counties.
Since the old form does not conform to constitutional require-
167. Greenville County uses separate forms for stolen goods and liquor. The
affidavit for stolen goods is as follows:
PERSONALLY appeared before me
who, first being duly sworn, on oath deposes and says that the following goods
and chattels, to-wit:
the property of
have within - days past, or were on - , 19---, by
stolen and taken out of possession of
in the County aforesaid; and also that the said affiant believes that such goods,
or a part thereof, are concealed in or about the of
at in said County;
The facts on which such belief is based are
[9 additional lines omitted]
Affiant




The search warrant for stolen goods is as follows:
WHEREAS, Complaint on oath has been made to me,by
that certain personal property, to-wit:
was stolen and taken out of possession of
in the County aforesaid by
on the - day of - , 19-, and that the said
has probable cause to believe that the said property, or a part thereof, is con-
cealed in or about the of
These are, therefore, to command you in the name of the State of South
Carolina, with the necessary and proper assistance to enter in the day or night
time the place where the said property is suspected to be concealed, and there
diligently search for the said property, and that you bring the same, or any
part thereof, found on search forthwith before me to be disposed of and dealt
with according to law.
GIVEN under my hand this - day of , 19_.
Magistrate
The affidavit and search warrant for liquor is as follows:
PERSONALLY appeared before me, (officer or deponent)
who being sworn, says that he is informed by (source of information)
and has good cause to believe that -(person_ oroccupant)(person or occupant)
has concealed on his person, on his premises, or in his dwelling, or in a motor
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ments, these new affidavit forms are commended to the attention
of state law enforcement agencies.
III. Coqc usIoN
It is probable that the federal standard of search and seizure
is now enforceable against the states in its entirety. If not, the
law is unquestionably moving in that direction and adherence
to that standard would be highly desirable. Subject to the fur-
ther limitations of the South Carolina statutes restricting
searches to stolen goods, contraband liquors or narcotics the con-
stitutional standard for the state is that established by the federal
courts. The additional protection established by the state statutes,
however, are believed not to be commensurate with the public
need. The interests of law enforcement would best be served by
an amendment increasing the permissive scope of lawful searches;
individual rights would not be substantially impaired because
of the protection guaranteed by the state constitution.
HowARD P. KiNG
a quantity of contraband whiskey.
The facts on which such belief is based are these:
(state information. Use back of page to complete statement if necessary)
[9 additional lines omitted]
Deponent
Sworn to before me this the
- day of , 19 .
Magistrate
TO THE SHERIFF OR ANY CONSTABLE OF GREENVILLE
COUNTY:
You are hereby authorized and empowered to search the person, premises,
dwelling and vehicle above mentioned and described and if you find thereon or
therein any quantity of contraband alcoholic liquors you will seize the same
and bring the responsible person or persons before me for examination.






South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 5 [1964], Art. 6
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol17/iss5/6
